

# Anthony F. Germann

## F-105 History

---

**20-Feb-68**

5872

Maj David C. Dickson, Jr. from the 34 TFS, 388 TFW, flew his 87th combat mission against a target near Dien Bien Phu, in RP-5, North Vietnam.

Capt Joseph S. Sechler, also from the 34th, flew his fourth mission over North Vietnam. His flight lineup was:

- #1 - Maj William M. Blakeslee
- #2 - Capt Joseph S. Sechler
- #3 - Maj James Hardin Metz
- #4 - Capt Anthony F. Germann

Capt Sechler logged 3:00 flying hours.

Lt Col Rufus Dye, Jr., 34 TFS, flew as "Bass 4" to bomb Vinh airfield in RP-3. "... Fired at SAM ring." It was his 45th combat mission.

*Carolyn Dickson, 20 Apr 09 letter giving annotation on cigar band dated 20 Feb 68 & Joe Sechler flight log via e-mail 28 Apr 10 & Rufus Dye Mission History log.*

**21-Feb-68**

5873

"Gator" Flight from the 34 TFS flew a mission into Laos and North Vietnam. The lineup was:

- #1 - Maj Clyde L. Falls, Jr. flying F-105D 59-1760
- #2 - Capt John S. Murphy flying 60-0436 on his 3rd combat mission
- #3 - Maj Carl B. Light flying 61-0162
- #4 - Capt David C. Dickson flying 60-0435 on his 88th combat mission
- Spare - 60-5375

Each aircraft carried six 750-lb bombs, two AIM-9s on a dual-mount pylon on one outboard and an ECM pod on the other outboard. Each of the 20-mm cannons had a full load of ammo.

The flight left Korat at 15:30 for a 16:30 TOT. Inbound to the target, they refueled at 16:00 from White Anchor 44 at 16,000 feet, the same tanker they used for post-strike refueling. Their fragged target was the Ban Van NE military complex in Laos but they ended up in North Vietnam strafing trucks in RP-1 near Quang Khe.

John Murphy recalled the mission. "The target area was, as was most of Southeast Asia on that day, completely obscured by clouds. We most likely dropped our ordnance via "COMBAT SKY SPOT" (ground controlled/directed radar-guided release), straight and level above the cloud deck, all four aircraft in route formation, and all at the same time. I am sure we did drop while over Laos.

"Following the drop, Lead asked the airborne command post for permission to enter N. Vietnam for armed road recce. Permission was granted, though cloud cover might prevent access. Again, I don't remember who came up on the same radio freq. though most likely it was a "Misty FAC" (F-100 Forward Air Controller), and he told us there were trucks on a road north of Dong Hoi. We continued on in an easterly direction. Cloud cover prevented us from seeing anything below; the terrain was completely blocked from view.

"Maj. Falls told the flight he was going to lead us down through the cloud deck and hopefully get under the cloud cover while we were out over the South China Sea. We tucked our aircraft in tight and flew on his wing in close fingertip formation, and started down through the clouds. We finally broke-out, over the sea at ... an altitude of 2000 to 3000 feet above the water, perhaps lower. We

# Anthony F. Germann

## F-105 History

---

turned back to the west and proceeded to cross the NVN shore line. The cloud base was ragged, varying in height above the ground. Lead found the trucks and we all started to take separation on Lead in order to establish our individual gun runs. To me, it seemed as though we were in a very tight opening, almost like being inside an enclosed football field, low clouds with very limited horizontal visibility. The fact that we were traveling at 450 - 500 kts inside a 'mixing bowl' did not help me to acquire the target(s). I was busy keeping Lead and the other flight members in sight, and staying within the limits of the 'bowl'.

"I set up my first firing pass, trying to gain separation from Lead and pick out my target, but not very successfully. I saw Lead get off his first firing pass while I was still fighting to get into a firing position. At that point I made the decision to abandon my pass, stay out of the way of the flight members behind me, and to join on Lead in a fighting wing position. I did not want to screw up this opportunity for the flight, I did not want to get forced back up in to the cloud deck, I did not want to become separated from the flight and become an issue for Lead, so I decided to jump on his wing and hang on. And, to complicate matters, I really didn't know exactly where we were.

"Over the next few minutes, I was not able to look at anything but to keep my Lead's 'light in the star' and say 'Two.' I don't remember how many passes the flight made on the trucks, but I would guess two or three. We were flying in a very tight 'circle' and pulling lots of G's. Lead finally called it off and we headed west, climbing back up through the clouds, and all joining up on top. We proceeded back to the Tanker for a post-strike refuel and then on back to Korat. Maj. Falls complemented me for staying out of the way."

Capt Joseph S. Sechler, also from the 34th, flew his fifth mission over North Vietnam. His flight lineup was:

- #1 - Lt Col Nevin G. Christensen
- #2 - Capt Anthony F. Germann
- #3 - Maj James Hardin Metz
- #4 - Capt Joseph S. Sechler

Capt Sechler logged 3:05 flying hours.

*John C. Murphy's mission card and narrative via e-mail 22 Jan 2011 & Carolyn Dickson, 20 Apr 09 letter giving annotation on cigar band dated 21 Feb 68 & Joe Sechler flight log via e-mail 28 Apr 10.*

**06-Mar-68**

4889

The four pilots in "Pistol" flight from the 34 TFS bombed a target in northern Laos. They took off at 0610 and returned after 2 hours 15 minutes. Their line up was:

- #1 - Maj Eugene Paul Beresik (KIA, 31 May 68)
- #2 - Capt Anthony F. Germann
- #3 - Maj Almer L. "Buddy" Barner, Jr.
- #4 - Maj Spence M. "Sam" Armstrong flying F-105D 60-5375

This was Maj Armstrong's 80th combat mission. "I was Mission Commander again today and got all of the way through the briefing. We finally executed 1st alt and had a radar drop in northern Laos near Sam Neua. I let Gene Beresik pinch hit for me and lead. It was an uneventful drop. We then made an armed recce of Rte #7 and didn't spot anything though it was partially clear."

"Crossbow" was another 34th squadron flight that went to North Vietnam. Their lineup was:

- #1 - Lt Col Rufus Dye, Jr. flying his 49th mission.
- #2 - Capt Joseph S. Sechler flying his 14th mission. He logged 2:35 flying hours.

# Anthony F. Germann

## F-105 History

---

- #3 - Maj Donald W. Hodge
- #4 - Capt Lawrence L. Bogemann

Col Dye recorded his call sign as "Crossbow 02". In his mission log, the flight was fragged for a strike in the Steel Tiger (SL) region of Laos. Due to weather, the flight dropped their bombs using Sky Spot radar on the Ba Nam Highway segment in RP-1.

*Maj Armstrong's 100-mission combat log, pg 31 & Joe Sechler, flight log via e-mail 28 Apr 10 & Rufus Dye, Mission History log.*

### 20-Mar-68

4906

The four pilots in "Scuba" flight from the 34 TFS bombed a road in RP-1. They took off at 1355 and returned after 4 hours 10 minutes. Their line up was:

- #1 - Lt Col James B. Ross
- #2 - Maj Eugene Paul Beresik (KIA, 31 May 68)
- #3 - Maj Spence M. "Sam" Armstrong flying F-105D 60-0409
- #4 - Capt Anthony F. Germann

This was Maj Armstrong's 89th combat mission. "We got words at the last minute today to go primary. It looked pretty good for awhile but we started running into clouds right at Tanker drop-off. It was undercast there just short of the coast and we had to weather abort about 25 miles from the target (just abeam Gia Lam Airfield) 2 miles from the heart of Hanoi. We took our bombs out and finally got to the tankers after being given the run-around for 15 minutes by the radar agency. We took our bombs over into Pack I and dropped them on a road and recovered with very little fuel after hitting a tanker in White Anchor."

Lt Gen Armstrong mentioned this mission in his memoirs. "My last Pack VIA mission was my 89th. This was a target close to Gia Lam Airfield in Hanoi and we found the weather completely undercast dropping off the tankers in the Gulf. Lt. Col. Ross was the mission commander and I was his deputy. I concurred when he called the abort and we dropped our bombs in Pack I on our own recognizance."

"Pancho" was another 34th flight on a mission to RP-6 but was diverted due to weather. Its lineup was:

- #1 - Maj Roger D. Ingvalson
- #2 - Maj Billy R. Givens
- #3 - Maj William P. Shunney
- #4 - Capt Joseph S. Sechler flying his 19th mission. He logged 3:50 flying time. "RP 6 (Wx abort 10 mi N of Hung Yen)"

*Maj Armstrong's 100-mission combat log, pg 34 & Lt Gen USAF (Ret) Spence M. "Sam" Armstrong, unpublished memoir in chapter titled "Southeast Asia October 1967 - May 1968", pg 42 & Joe Sechler, mission log via e-mail 28 Apr 10.*

### 06-Apr-68

4911

"Waco" flight from the 34 TFS hit a truck park in Laos. The flight took off at 0640 and returned after flying for 3 hours. The line up was:

- #1 - Lt Col Robert W. Smith, 34 TFS Commander
- #2 - Capt Anthony F. Germann
- #3 - Maj Spence M. "Sam" Armstrong flying F-105D 61-0167
- #4 - Capt Joseph S. Sechler flying his 28th combat mission. He logged 3:00 hours flying time.

# Anthony F. Germann

## F-105 History

---

This was Maj Armstrong's 92nd combat mission. "I logged 2 hours of weather on this one. I was by myself in the weather from take-off to just prior to reaching the tanker. We were fragged into Pack I but were diverted by Cricket to a Nail FAC in middle Laos. We hit a suspect truck park but didn't get anything out of it. L/C Smith asked for permission into the Package but it was denied. We started to head home with a non-counter when I suggested we contact 'Hillsboro' for clearance into the DMZ so I switched over to their frequency and they approved the request so we turned around and went in for a weather recce. Then it was back through the weather to here where it was raining."

*Maj Armstrong's 100-mission combat log, pg 35.*

**16-Apr-68**

6567

The 34 TFS, 388 TFW, launched "Waco" flight from Korat. The lineup was:

- #1 - Maj Eugene Paul Beresik
- #2 - Capt Anthony F. Germann
- #3 - Capt William A. Thomas, Jr.
- #4 - Capt Joseph S. Sechler flying his 31st combat mission. He logged 2:50 flying time.

*Joe Sechler, mission log via e-mail 28 Apr 10.*

**21-Apr-68**

3165

Maj Robert H. Braden from the 44 TFS led "Ozark" flight on an Iron Hand mission over North Vietnam. He flew F-105F 63-8319. Capt James V. Barr was "Ozark 2" in F-105F 63-8268. "Ozark 3" was Maj Charles W. McConnell in F-105F 62-4428 and Capt Anthony F. Germann, 34 TFS, was "Ozark 4" flying F-105F 63-8336 that was configured for Combat Martin with the rear seat removed. F-105F 63-8306 was the flight's unneeded spare with pilot Lt Col Guy J. "Jack" Sherrill and EWO Capt John A. Stetson.

The flight left Korat at 12:40 and took on fuel at 13:05 from a KC-135 with call sign "Blue Anchor 35" flying at 14,000 feet. They reached the target at 13:45 and, during their return to Korat, refueled from the same tanker, this time at 22,000 feet.

Having arrived at Korat on 14 March 1968, Lt Col Sherrill, the 44 TFS squadron commander, went on an R&R to Bangkok, U Tapao, and the Australian Embassy cottage at Pattya Beach, Thailand. At this point, he had flown a total of 17 combat missions.

*Mission Cards of Lt Col Guy J. "Jack" Sherrill and e-mail 7 Apr 2003.*

**27-May-68**

**30-May-68**

4077

Between 27 - 30 May 1968, three F-105 pilots from the 34 TFS, 388 TFW, visited forward air controller units in the I Corps area of South Vietnam for cross training to improve F-105 close air support to FACs in South Vietnam. The pilots were Maj Ivor K. Goodrich, who visited the "Helix" FACs supporting the 23rd Infantry "Americal" Division; Capt Anthony F. Germann, who visited the "Rash" FACs of the 20 TASS supporting the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile); and Capt William A. Thomas, Jr., whose trip report didn't identify the unit he visited.

In his report, Maj Goodrich wrote, "The mission in I Corps, South Vietnam, generally falls into the area of close air support. In many cases, we could be expected to provide support to U.S. troops in contact with the enemy. Such close air support is presently provided by the A-1E, F-100, A-4 and F-4, and now the F-105 is expected to provide similar support. There are several reasons why the F-105 has trouble matching the close air support provided by these other aircraft. The following comments relate to problem areas brought to my attention during the visit with the 'HELIX' FACs of the Americal Division.

## Anthony F. Germann

### F-105 History

---

"a. First, we don't carry high drag weapons. Thus we can't make low angle, low altitude deliveries.

"b. Another problem concerns the high angle dive bombing techniques used by the F-105 pilots. This technique involves a high altitude roll-in to achieve a 45-degree dive angle, which necessitates about a 6,000 foot minimum bomb release altitude. The biggest difficulty in regard to these type tactics is that the FAC has difficulty acquiring the fighters visually until bomb release or after. Keep in mind that the FACs are accustomed to working A-4s and F-100s delivering from a 30-degree dive to level at much lower altitudes.

"c. Closely related to the problem of dive angle and high altitude releases is the fuze arming time set on our bombs. The six second arming precludes release below 6,000 feet in a 45-degree dive or 4,000 feet in a 30-degree dive, assuming 500 KCAS at release. A lower arming time would provide more flexibility in our tactics.

"d. In addition, frequently the exact position of the enemy is not known to the FAC and he likes to employ a 'probing' technique. Specifically he wants the fighters to make multiple passes dropping one or two bombs at a time in slightly different locations according to his directions. Our inability to drop in pairs off the center line MER tends to inhibit the 'probing' technique. Related to this is the problem encountered when the number 2 man rolls in with or slightly behind the lead. When this happens, the FAC is unable to correct two's bombs off lead's impacts.

"e. In 90% of the cases where slick bombs are required, .025 second fuzing is most appropriate. This is because the targets are usually bunkers or trench complexes that are best destroyed by bombs that penetrate the surface. Instantaneous or .01 fuzing is not effective in most cases. The FACs feel we should use .025 fuzing for our work in South Vietnam.

"f. In cases where friendly troops are in close contact and requiring air support, accuracy becomes extremely important. Coupled with this is the requirement for deliveries to be made as a specific run-in heading, which will tend to insure safety of the friendly forces. It is here that the FACs get a little nervous with our high altitude releases and steep dive angles. He likes to be able to see that the fighter is in fact on the right attack heading and to insure himself that the drop will be clear of the friendly troops. As noted previously, visual acquisition of the fighters is not easy in the case of F-105s and a 150 meter impact error may be too much. In this regard, the FACs like to give corrections in terms of clock positions using the run in heading as 12 o'clock. This is opposed to the North/South, East/West method reportedly preferred by some F-105 pilots.

"g. Last but not least, is the maneuvering capability of the F-105, plus the fuel reserves needed to get back to the refueling track.

"h. Other areas of interest concerned the fact that the FACs I worked with do not get the 'base' altitude or time. 'base' plus a stated altitude meant nothing to them. In addition, most FACs did not realize that we have the M-61 cannon and therefore were not aware of our strafing capability. It was noted that we seldom report the availability of our 20-mm munition when reporting ordnance to the FAC."

Maj Goodrich concluded his report by stating, "In spite of our alleged shortcomings, [the FACs] could not remember putting in a bad set of F-105s."

Capt Germann's report included similar points and added several additional ones. "Don't drop rocket pods in SVN because the VC use them against the friendly forces. ... The CBU type ordnance is not used in the 1st Air Cav area. This is because the VC use the unexploded munitions to make their own booby traps and mines. ... A large number of targets assigned to the F-105 by the 1st Air Cav Division is to make landing sites for airborne assault operations. With small

# Anthony F. Germann

## F-105 History

---

hilltops it is absolutely necessary to hit the target. With our present type loads consisting of the 6 X 750 and the 2 X 7,000 [3,000?] these make excellent targets for the F-105."

Capt Thomas' report, while covering many of the same points, added still other comments. "The first recommendation that FAC's had was that we continue to put forth most of our efforts in Pack 1. They are concerned with the increase in supplies and activities in the South since this bomb pause. On the other hand they would like to work with us. At present, our ordnance and tactics are not compatible with their needs. ..."

*388 TFW history, Apr - Jun 68, Vol II, USAF microfilm NO584, frames 1256 - 1262.*

**15-Jul-68**      **17-Jul-68**

4078

Between 15 - 17 July 1968, three pilots from the 34 TFS from the 388 TFW visited the MISTY FACs of the 37 TFW at Phu Cat AB, South Vietnam. The visit was to "... exchange ...ideas and techniques to further a better working relationship between the two Wings." The pilots were: Capt Anthony F. Germann, Capt Joseph Sechler, and 1Lt David Harsman. Capt Germann wrote a report summarizing the lessons learned from the trip.

"Each of the three pilots got to fly with and participate in an actual combat mission in Pack I of NVN. This flight was an important part of the trip because it allowed the strike pilots to see the Misty operations first hand."

"The three 34 TFS pilots were instructed on improved techniques of spotting enemy supply/storage caches, truck parks, AAA sites and were shown the areas of RP-1 that were most significant in enemy supply movement. At the same time, the Misty pilots were briefed on the ordnance delivering characteristics of the F-105, including capabilities and limitations. ... Because of the interest and cooperation generated, two Misty pilots were allowed to visit Korat RTAFB to view the F-105 strike operations."

"Some of the suggestions and recommendations that evolved from the experience are:

"a. Strike pilots should familiarize themselves with typical truck park areas and 57, 37-mm sites. Some pictures have been obtained to facilitate this.

"b. Strike pilots should be familiar with the most common routes in Pack I by number as well as by color code. The Misty's refer to the main routes by number such as 15, 137, 110, 101, 1A and 1036 (Bat Lake Road). It has been recommended to the Intelligence Section of the 388 TFW to set up a 1:50,000 scale map for better crew familiarization of those routes and the entire Pack I area. A thorough knowledge of this area, including such geographical points as 'Disappearing River' and others of prominence is imperative to expediting the rendezvous with the FAC.

"c. The Misty's make use of the following Delta points in Pack I and it is important that each strike pilot be familiar with them. They are the following: 10, 15, 17, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 50, 55, 56, 60, 62, 65, 70, 74, 76, 80, 81, 83, and 85.

"d. Two main requests came from the FACs in that they don't feel F-105 pilots are taking enough tactical evasive maneuvers in the Pack such as jinks. The other is that when a strike pilot calls in on a target he should call direction he is in from rather than to and always call off the target.

"e. Other points of tactics brought out were that pilots should talk more than the FAC, by this I mean when trying to make target acquisition tell the Misty what you see as well as what he is trying to point out to you. Never drop hot on a target unless you have positively identified it. Don't be hesitant in telling the FAC not to mark if you are not in good position. You, as the strike pilot, can direct the Misty when to mark.

# Anthony F. Germann

## F-105 History

---

"f. The final point brought up during this exchange with Misty was that when rolling in on a firing gun position each pilot should roll in varying headings of 60 to 90 degrees and make the interval as close as possible so as not to allow the guns time to reposition themselves for each member of the flight."

*388 TFW history, Apr - Jun 68, Vol II, USAF microfilm NO584, frames 1261 - 1262 & 388 TFW history, July - Sep 68, microfilm NO585, frames 0058 - 0060.*

### 27-Aug-68

763

"... (In) the Dong Hoi area, ... 388 TFW Thunderchief pilots cut a highway segment in 15 places, 26 miles west of the coastal city. Five of the pilots were Majors Vincent Colasuonno (34 TFS), and Douglas A. Roysdon (34 TFS), and Captains Jack S. Houser (469 TFS), Ralph E. Durnbaugh (34 TFS), and Anthony F. Germann (34 TFS)."

*Sawadee Flyer, Saturday, September 7, 1968, pg 1 & 4.*

### 31-Aug-68

4134

The 388 TFW history listed the aircrews assigned to the 34 TFS and the number of sorties each had flown as of the end of August 1968.

34 TFS	Sorties	Counters
Lt Col Klingensmith	59	43
Maj Langford	91	86
Capt Barr	84	67
Capt Sechler	105	87
Capt Murphy	107	97
Lt Col Christensen	118	105
Maj Roysdon	109	89
Capt J. Hartman	116	94
Col Douglas	47	43
Capt Durnbaugh	65	56
Maj Goodrich	115	97
Maj Matthews	75	61
Capt William A. Thomas, Jr.	109	104
Capt Ahrens	79	59
Lt Col Dye	114	101
Capt Germann	97	86
Capt Thatcher	34	29
Maj Shunney	107	95
Capt Brooks	80	66
Capt Bogemann	115	97
Capt Fuhrman	118	99
Lt Col Shaver	80	66
1Lt Confer	33	28
Capt Pharmer end of Aug)	114	99 (Capt Pharmer had flown 100 missions by the
Capt Durkee end of Aug)	111	99 (Capt Durkee had flown 100 missions by the
Capt Everett	69	56
Lt Col Ross	122	108
Col Stewart	118	110
Capt Bell	70	57
Maj White	75	58
1Lt Venturi	36	29

## Anthony F. Germann F-105 History

---

1Lt Hoffmeyer	38	33
Capt Ducton	31	27
Capt Crouch	32	27
Lt Col Bancroft	20	16
Maj Colasuonno	33	29
1Lt Stafford	34	31
1Lt D. Hartman	33	27
Lt Col Glass	6	6
Maj Holly	4	3
Maj Knapp	8	5

*388 TFW History, July - Sep 68, USAF microfilm NO585, frames 0250 - 0251.*

### 30-Oct-68

4200

During October 1968, twenty-one pilots from the 34 TFS and 469 TFS received medals approved by 7 AF. They were:

Maj Ivor K. Goodrich DFC SO G-3158 23 Oct 68 (8 Mar - 3 Sep 68) and AM (1 - 9 OLC) SO G-3275 23 Oct 68 (8 Mar - 3 Sep 68)  
 Capt Kenneth G. Lindell DFC SO G-3160 17 Oct 68 (14 Jul 68)  
 1Lt David T. Dinan III DFC SO G-3161 17 Oct 68 (14 Jul 68)  
 Capt Richard E. Tracey DFC SO G-3169 17 Oct 68 (15 Jul 68)  
 Maj Albert F. Oppel AM SO G-3245 23 Oct 68 (25 Aug - 19 Sep 68)  
 Maj Manford C. Holly, Jr. AM SO G-3246 23 Oct 68 (25 Aug -16 Sep 68)  
 Capt Barry G. Swarts AM SO G-3250 23 Oct 68 (29 Aug - 21 Sep 68)  
 Capt John S. Murphy AM (1 - 9 OLC) SO G-3273 23 Oct 68 (3 Mar - 24 Sep 68)  
 Maj Douglas A. Roysdon AM (10 - 19 OLC) SO G-3278 23 Oct 68 (24 Feb - 2 Oct 68)  
 Maj Clarence E. Langford AM (1 - 9 OLC) SO G-3281 23 Oct 68 (29 Mar - 26 Sep 68)  
 Capt Jack D. Brooks AM (1 - 6 OLC) SO G-3284 23 Oct 68 (24 Apr - 5 Sep 68)  
 Capt Anthony F. Germann AM (1 - 9 OLC) SO G-3286 23 Oct 68 (4 Mar - 1 Oct 68)  
 Capt Douglas R. Young AM (18 OLC) SO G-3286 23 Oct 68 (26 Aug 15 - Sep 68)  
 Lt Col Dorwyn D. Shaver AM (22 - 26 OLC) SO G-3289 23 Oct 68 (30 Sep 67 - 14 Aug 68)  
 Lt Col John J. Gaudion AM (10 OLC) SO G-3291 23 Oct 68 (6 Sep - 23 Sep 68)  
 Lt Col Isaac M. Glass AM (1 OLC) SO G-3291 23 Oct 68 (25 Aug - 29 Sep 68)  
 Lt Col Rufus Dye, Jr. DFC (4 OLC) SO G-3023 5 Oct 68 (8 Jun 68) downgraded from SS  
 Capt Lamont H. Pharmer DFC (2 OLC) SO G-3024 5 Oct 68 (9 Jun 68) downgraded from SS  
 Capt Darrell J. Ahrens AM (1 OLC) SO G-3032 5 Oct 68 (1 Jun 68) downgraded from DFC  
 Maj Sterling H. Wood AM (1 OLC) SO G-3032 5 Oct 68 (30 May 68)  
 Capt John E. Hartman AM (1 - 9 OLC) SO G-3092 10 Oct 68 (23 Feb 67 - 5 Feb 68)

*388 TFW History, Oct - Dec 68, USAF microfilm NO585, frames 1767 - 1768.*